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Abstract
Several thousand Indonesians were in China on 1 October 1965, when six senior milit-
ary officers were killed in Jakarta by the Thirtieth of September Movement (G30S) in
a putsch blamed upon the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The event changed the
lives of Indonesians—inChina and in their homeland—irrevocably. This article exam-
ines the impact of bilateral state relations upon the fate of those Indonesian political
exiles in China and assesses the role of the Beijing-based leadership of the PKI (known
as the Delegation of the Central Committee) as it attempted to manage the party in
exile. Oral and written accounts by individual exiles are drawn upon to illustrate the
broader community experience and trauma of exile, which was particularly harsh dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution. The fate of the Indonesian exiles during this tempestuous
period of Chinese politics was exacerbated by the failure of the delegation and, ulti-
mately, by the exiles’ eventual rejection by the Chinese state.
Keywords
exile – Indonesian Communist Party – delegation – Central Committee – Adjitorop –
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1 Introduction
Indonesia and China have had a long, complex relationship, resting as much
upon the accretion of cultural, including ethnic, links as upon post-indepen-
dence conflicts and a coalescence of interests (Liu 2011). This article analyses
Downloaded from Brill.com07/02/2020 01:41:50AM
via free access
delegated authority 339
Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde 176 (2020) 338–372
the case of Indonesianpolitical exiles inChina after themilitary-backed regime
seized power in Indonesia in 1965, drawing upon interviews, memoirs, and
autobiographical fiction.1 It examines their fate within the context of bilateral
state relations and evaluates the role of the Beijing-based leadership of the
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) and the dimin-
ishing agency of the exiles. In this, it engages with two related fields of schol-
arship: studies of the China–Indonesia relationship as an example of ColdWar
inter-state politics; and diasporic and exilic studies’ recent recognition of the
Indonesia diaspora.2 While there is a vast literature on Chinese political exiles
abroad, there are few studies of political exiles from other countries in China,
with Indonesians being a significant case in point.3
Liu (2011:6–11) noted studies of the relationship between Indonesia and
China tended to focus on four themes: diplomacy; cultural exchanges; the
evolution of the Indonesian Communist Party; and Chinese communities in
Indonesia. These foci have broadened since his observation, particularly with
recent studies of Indonesian students in China (Theo 2018) and China’s role in
the Afro-Asian movement during the ColdWar (Zhou 2019a). This article con-
tributes an analysis of the role played by the Beijing-based leadership of the
Indonesian Communist Party in managing this community of exiles and the
various responses of exiles to such controls, including gaining political asylum
in other countries. Its approach contributes to exilic studies’ move ‘away from
writers and well-known political figures towards the vast majority of refugees’,
enabled by ‘the collection of oral historymaterial and interviewswith so-called
“ordinary” refugees’; it was ‘aided by more and more people writing autobi-
ographies, for publication and for more private use’ (Hammel and Grenville
2015:xi).4 Thus, the sources used are largely those from the exiles themselves.5
1 I interviewed over fifty Indonesian exiles in seven countries, and seven who had returned to
Indonesia. Interviews, commonly lasting for about three hours, were usually recorded (with
permission), with anonymity occasionally requested. ‘Autobiographical fiction’ refers to the
merging of autobiographical and fictive elements in a narrative.
2 See, for example, the special issues of RIMA (Vol. 44, No. 1, 2010), titled ‘Indonesian exiles:
Crossing cultural, political and religious borders’, and Indonesia and theMalayWorld (Vol. 40,
Issue 117, 2012), on Indonesians overseas; and postgraduate research theses such as Gurning
2011, Sipayung 2011, and Theo 2018.
3 As an example of the numerous studies of Chinese exiles abroad, see Chen 2018. In her study
of Westerners in China under Mao, Hooper (2016:168) notes the diverse foreign community
included ‘would-be revolutionaries and political exiles who could go home only if the polit-
ical situation changed in their country’, yet studies of such exiles are rare, with an example
(of another Southeast Asian exile group) being Militante 1999.
4 Chambert-Loir (2016:157) identifies 42 published and unpublished Indonesian exilic autobi-
ographies.
5 Primary-source materials were in Indonesian, as I have no facility with Chinese.
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For clarity, our focus here is not on the more commonly analysed Chinese
in Indonesia or Indonesians of Chinese descent per se, but on Indonesian
nationals (regardless of whether they are of pribumi [indigenous] or Chinese
ethnicity) in China. It draws upon, but extends, the work of Theo by includ-
ing non-students, and the comprehensive studies of Zhou6 by highlighting the
particularities of Indonesian exiles in theunfoldinghistory of this bilateral rela-
tionship. Its focus is those exiles from Indonesia who were either already in
China on 30 September 1965 or who came subsequently from other countries
because their political affiliations (rather than their ethnicity) made return to
Indonesia too dangerous.7
On 1 October 1965, Beijing’s Tiananmen Square was the centre of anniversary
celebrations of the 1949 establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Hon-
oured guests included an official delegation of about 500 Indonesians con-
sisting of 28 sub-groups of representatives of government, a range of political
parties, mass organizations, the military, and cultural and artistic organiza-
tions.8 The delegation had arrived in China only days before on a planned
one-month visit. Its size and prominent membership reflected the importance
placed by President Sukarno and his supporters upon the bond with China.9
Unbeknown to them, in Jakarta, six seniormilitary officers had been killed by a
shadowy organization, dubbed the Gerakan Tiga Puluh September (G30S, the
Thirtieth of September Movement) in a military putsch blamed over the fol-
lowing decades upon the Indonesian Communist Party.10 In its wake, the lives
of Indonesians in China and in their homeland were changed irrevocably.
6 Zhou’s important contributions to this field include Zhou 2013, 2014, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c.
Zhou 2019b and Zhou 2019c (which is an Indonesian edition of 2019b with an additional
chapter on political exiles) appeared after this article was initially submitted but prior to
final corrections.
7 The estimated 500,000 ethnic Chinese who left Indonesia, either following government
decrees in 1960 to expel Chinese from rural areas (Zhou 2013:14–6) or as a result of the
anti-Chinese backlash after 30 September 1965 (Xie 2010; Tan and Lin 2019:6–8), are not
within our focus. On the Chinese in Indonesia, see Coppel 1983, 2002; Mackie 1976; and
Zhou 2019b, 2019c.
8 Interview with Kadir Sulardjo, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 13-11-2008; see also Zhou
2014:55.
9 Zhou (2014:55) claims therewere approximately 4,000 additional Indonesian visitors from
various other delegations scattered throughoutChina forNationalDay, but this is regarded
as unlikely by a leading Indonesian exile in Beijing at that time (Tom Iljas, personal com-
munication, 31-5-2019).
10 On 30 September’s brutal aftermath in Indonesia, see Melvin 2018, particularly pages 2 to
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2 Diplomatic Relations
The year 1949 was both that in which Indonesia’s independence, declared by
nationalists under Sukarno in August 1945, was officially recognized by the
Netherlandswith the formal transfer of sovereignty, aswell as the year inwhich
Mao Zedong founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Amidst the many
demands of early statehood, the formal establishment of diplomatic relations
took time. The PRC despatched an ambassador to Jakarta on 14August 1950, but
Jakarta reciprocated only on 14 January 1951 by sending a chargé d’affaires11 to
Beijing. There was some hesitancy, as the Indonesian government was ‘in prac-
tice anti-communist’ and unwilling to risk American support by moving too
close to China (Sukma 1999:20). For its part, China’s leadership was initially
critical of Sukarno’s ‘fascist’ tendencies, labelling him a ‘puppet of Western
imperialism’ (Sukma 1999:20–1). Indonesia’s official foreign policy was non-
alignment. In reality, virtually all its diplomatic missions were in Western or
non-communist states, with the exception of the USSR, with which Indonesia
had opened diplomatic relations on 3 February 1950. Establishing a presence in
Beijing, albeit under a chargé d’affaires, expanded Jakarta’s external relations
butmaintainedChina at a less prominent level than keyWestern states (Sukma
1999:22–3).
The following decade, Indonesian politicians, artists, and students were
drawn to China, making numerous, often highly publicized, visits. When at-
tending the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 1955, Chinese premier
ZhouEnlai stressedChinawanted positive bilateral relations. So keenwas Pres-
ident Sukarno to host a visit by ChairmanMao that he issued no less than eight
invitations—all ultimately declined (Liu 2011:76, fn. 63). Yet, increased eco-
nomic nationalism in Indonesia sometimes disadvantaged the Chinese, not-
ably a 1959 Presidential Directive (Peraturan Presiden Nomor 10 Tahun 1959)
prohibiting foreign nationals from commercial activities in rural areas. This
caused many Chinese in rural Indonesia to relocate to the cities. An estimated
100,000 moved to China (Zhou 2013).
6. Zhou (2013:17) argues: ‘On the basis of newly available Chinese language materials, it is
highly likely that the 30 September Movement was plotted by a secret bureau of the PKI,
and that the plot was kept obscured from the rest of the party members, excluding a few
top leaders.’
11 A chargé d’affaires ‘represents the leader of his or her government, either temporarily
while the ambassador is away, or permanently in a countrywhere there is no ambassador’.
See https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/charge‑d‑affaires (accessed 17-1-
2019).
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These and other ructions (such as anti-Chinese riots in Bandung in May
1963) did not prevent the two governments from forging a close alliance inter-
nationally, for ‘Sukarno’s confrontational view of world politics convergedwith
China’s perception of the principal contradiction being between imperial-
ism and the Third World’ (Sukma 1999:31). Sukarno’s 16-day visit to China in
September–October 1956 had a profound influence upon his political thinking
(Soyomukti 2012). ByAugust 1965,with Indonesiawithdrawing from theUnited
Nations (UN) and Sukarno adopting an increasingly strident anti-imperialist
crusade against Great Britain in Southeast Asia, he declared a ‘Jakarta–Beijing
Axis’, with China supporting his wish to establish a Conference of the New
Emerging Forces (CONEFO) in Jakarta as an alternative to the UN. It was a rela-
tionship vulnerable to domestic rivalries between the Indonesian armed forces
and the PKI, which inclined towards Beijing as China’s tensions with the USSR
heightened.12
Hundreds of Indonesian students, artists, and professionals sought oppor-
tunities to study or gain practical experience in China.13 Study programmes
and visits were often—though not always—sponsored by the respective com-
munist parties or sympathetic, left-leaning organizations such as the Lembaga
Kebudayaan Rakyat (Lekra, Institute of People’s Culture).14 Lekra office-bearer
Kuslan Budiman (1935–2018), for example, went to China in January 1965 to
study stage and set decoration, particularly innovations in Peking Opera.15 The
events of 30 September 1965 had a profound impact upon the life of Budiman
and all Indonesians in China, irrespective of their political orientation.
12 Zhou (2013) provides a thoughtful discussion of Chinese government sources’ depiction
of the bilateral politics of this period.
13 These were in addition to the approximately 18,800 Chinese-Indonesian students in
China, according to the Hong Kong newspaper Da Gong Bao on 21 December 1960 (Theo
2018:53–4). Theo (2018) provides an excellent discussion of such student contacts. On eth-
nic Chinese from Indonesia who relocated to China prior to 1965, see Godley and Coppel
1990.
14 On Lekra, see Foulcher 1986 and Bodden 2010.
15 Interviewwith Kuslan Budiman, 18-11-2008,Woerden, the Netherlands. On Budiman’s life,
see RH Priyambodo, ‘In memoriam—Sastrawan eksil Kuslan Budiman’, ANTARANews, 7-
12-2018. https://www.antaranews.com/berita/775593/in‑memoriam‑sastrawan‑eksil‑kusl
an‑budiman (accessed 18-1-2019).
Downloaded from Brill.com07/02/2020 01:41:50AM
via free access
delegated authority 343
Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde 176 (2020) 338–372
3 Initial Responses to G30S
For Indonesians in China, that day the initial challenge was to find out exactly
what was unfolding in Indonesia. Even the Chinese leadership was relying
entirely on foreign media such as Associated Press, Agence France-Presse, and
Reuters for the first 24 hours, as radio signals from the Chinese embassy in
Jakarta were being disrupted (Zhou 2014:51–2). It was not until 2 October that
a telegram arrived in Beijing from the Jakarta embassy confirming Sukarno’s
safety. Similarly, communications from the Jakarta office of Xinhua (NewChina
News Agency) were blocked. That same day, an Indonesian Air Force planewas
despatched from Jakarta to collect a small number of high-rankingmembers of
the Beijing delegation who wished to return home (Zhou 2014:56).
In their quest for information, the Indonesian delegation pooled any details
they could glean from their local contacts. Some, like 29-year-old medical stu-
dent Kadir Sulardjo, who was representing the Consentrasi Gerakan Mahas-
iswa Indonesia (CGMI, Concentration of the Indonesian Students’Movement),
were informed by a Chinese government spokesperson at their Beijing hotel.16
Sulardjo picked up more details sketchily over the following weeks from his
host organization, the Persatuan Pemuda Seluruh Tiongkok (All-China Youth
Federation). The PersatuanWartawan Indonesia (PWI, Indonesian Journalists’
Association) participants used their close links with the All-China Journalists’
Association to seek updates.17 Journalist Aristides Katoppo (1938–2019), who
had been monitoring broadcasts by Major-General Soeharto in his hotel, was
able to inform the delegation head, parliamentary chair (Ketua MPRS) Chairul
Saleh that President Sukarno was reportedly safe.18 Sulardjo recalls that the
Chinese met with his group individually to advise that it might be prudent to
remain in China.
In addition, as Hearman (2010b:89) points out: ‘After news broke overseas
about the attempted coup on 30 September, the Indonesian ambassador to
China, Djawoto [a former editor-in-chief of the national ANTARA news agency
and chair of the PWI], advised Indonesians in China not to rush home and to
monitor developments first.’ Over subsequent weeks news of the fate of those
who returned, such as Comite Central PKI (PKI Central Committee) member
Wikana, who was arrested on arrival on 10 October and subsequently disap-
peared, highlighted the risks for leftists or Sukarnoists of returning home. Less
16 Interview with Kadir Sulardjo, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 13-11-2008. Basorie 2018 pro-
vides background on Sulardjo.
17 Interview with Soeprijadi Tomodihardjo, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 30-5-2009.
18 Interview with Aristides Katoppo, Ubud, Indonesia, 2-10-2014.
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than half of the delegation in Beijing—one source estimated about 200 of the
initial 500—remained in China.19
Indonesian students there relied heavily on international radio news bullet-
ins for updates. One wrote in his (fictionalized?) account that Radio Australia
‘broadcast that all Indonesian students taskedwith studies in the PRCwould be
withdrawn to our homeland’.20Mawie Ananta Jonie (1940–2017), who had only
recently begun studies at the Sports Academy (after preparatory Chinese lan-
guage training), found out from a Japanese classmate who had heard Japanese
radio news reports.21 Mawie (see Figure 1) sought out other Indonesian stu-
dents for clarification, went to the Harian Rakyat (People’s Daily) newspaper’s
Beijing bureau, and also gleaned details from Radio Australia. Like many such
students, it was several months before he felt he had a reasonable grasp of the
situation.
The ideological polarization in Indonesia was reflected within both the
broader exile community and Indonesian embassies around the world, includ-
ing Beijing. When Indonesian ambassadors in Asia were called to Bangkok for
a briefing by the secretary general of the Kementerian Luar Negeri (Indonesian
Foreign Ministry) at the end of 1965, the Indonesian ambassador in China and
Mongolia, Djawoto (1906–1992), did not attend, sending his deputy instead.22
Unlike other states such as in Eastern Europe, because of the particular politics
of ambassador Djawoto, Indonesians in China were not initially summoned to
the embassy to sign declarations of loyalty to Soeharto’s New Order.
Mirroring polarization in Indonesian embassies elsewhere, in Beijing ‘[it]
seemed that within the Indonesian Embassy itself there was a split between
those who supported or condemned the coup d’état’ (Arthanegara 2007:65).
Pro-Soeharto embassy staff were inviting sympathetic students to their apart-
ments formeals and debriefing, with such students frequentlymeeting themil-
itary attaché, the assistant military attaché, and the cultural attaché. Such pro-
Soeharto students, clearly in the minority in China, mobilized clandestinely
19 Interview with Kadir Sulardjo, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 13-11-2008. Tomodihardjo
provided the estimate of 200 (interview with Soeprijadi Tomodihardjo, Amsterdam, the
Netherlands, 30-5-2009). Katoppo recalled that only two out of about 25 journalists in
the PWI delegation returned to Indonesia (himself and a Surabaya journalist from Duta
Masyarakat daily) (interview with Aristides Katoppo, Ubud, Indonesia, 2-10-2014).
20 Arthanegara 2007:173–4. Arthanegara studied Chinese in Beijing in the mid 1960s, sub-
sequently returning home to Indonesia. He does not describe this publication as either
novel or memoir, so its historicity may be questioned. It nonetheless illustrates broader
conditions. All translations from Indonesian are mine.
21 Interview with Mawie Ananta Jonie, Almere, the Netherlands, 16-11-2008; see also Jonie
2008:132.
22 Chanafiah and Chanafiah (2010:288) describe the meeting of ambassadors.
Downloaded from Brill.com07/02/2020 01:41:50AM
via free access
delegated authority 345
Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde 176 (2020) 338–372
figure 1 Mawie Ananta Jonie’s student bus pass, Beijing, 1966
provided by him
to counter the left-leaning Perhimpunan Pemuda Indonesia (PPI, Indonesian
YouthAssociation), which dominated Indonesian student activities in China.23
On 16 April 1966, Djawoto chose to stand down rather than serve the new
regime. He was helped to leave the embassy by young, leftist students, such
as Alimin (‘Tom’) Iljas (see Figure 2), in the middle of the night to avoid alert-
ing unsympathetic staff.24 Djawoto moved to a house provided by the Chinese
government and, in an early-morning press conference, outlined publicly his
reasons for relinquishing his position. He was effectively replaced as head of
mission by the military attaché, Colonel Slamet, who then implemented the
New Order policy of politically ‘screening’ all Indonesians and calling them to
the embassy for questioning about their political allegiances.
When the embassy instructed them to submit their passports for checking,
many, like education student Sarmadji and sports studentMawie, refused, fear-
23 Arthanegara (2007) refers to a pro-Soeharto organization called Himpunan Pemuda Pela-
jar Indonesia (HIPPI, Association of Indonesian Youth and Students) being established,
but leftist students there thenwereunaware of any suchpro-NewOrder organization (per-
sonal email, Tom Iljas, 6 May 2019).
24 Interview with Tom Iljas, Södertälje, Sweden, 11-6-2009.
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figure 2 (l to r) Tom Iljas, Syarkawi Manap, andWarsito Darmosukarto, Sweden, June 2009
Photo: David T. Hill
ing their passports would be confiscated and they would be forced to return
home. Those who refused had their passports cancelled. In response, Mawie
approached the SportsAcademy for assistance in gainingpolitical asylum,writ-
ing with this request to the international student section of the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs. He recalls more than half of the Indonesian students in China
chose to remain there.25 As they pondered their uncertain future, individuals
were faced with limited options: returning home as instructed by the Indone-
sian embassy, staying in China with the support of their hosts, or seeking ways
to emigrate to other countries (like Canada, Hong Kong, or Singapore), with
relocation more popular amongst private students but the most difficult of
options.26
Djawoto had not withdrawn from public affairs but returned to his former
role as secretary-general of the Afro-Asian Journalists’ Association. In the or-
ganization’s Afro-Asian Journalist periodical he ‘condemned the Suharto
regime’s “banning of progressive newspapers”, “mass arrests and massacre of
progressive journalists”, and “wanton interference and obstruction against the
AAJA Secretariat in Jakarta” ’ (Zhou 2019a:15). In response, he was denounced
by the military regime, which withdrew his citizenship.
25 See also Arthanegara 2007:194.
26 Interview with Mawie Ananta Jonie, Almere, the Netherlands, 16-11-2008.
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figure 3 Maman Tahsin (l.) and Kuslan Budiman (r.), Netherlands, November 2008
Photo: David T. Hill
Several former Indonesian ambassadors, who had stood down rather than
return to New Order Indonesia, gradually relocated to China. A.M. Hanafi
(1918–2004), the Indonesian ambassador to Cuba, who had supported an anti-
Soeharto delegation at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana, was stripped
of his post by the New Order in June 1966, after which he relocated to China
(Djamhari and TNI 2009:213–4). In October 1967, Suraedi Tahsin Sandjadirdja
(1923–2003), the former ambassador to Mali who had stood down in 1966 and
spent the intervening period in France, arrived in China with his family, where
they lived for years in a government hotel. His son, Maman Tahsin (see Fig-
ure 3), remembers the former ambassador to Vietnam, Sukrisno (d. 1999) (who
had initially sought refuge inRomania after being sacked as ambassador in June
1966), and senior staff from the embassy in Sri Lanka also relocating to China
rather than returning to Indonesia.27
Bilateral tensions heightened as anti-Chinese outbreaks in Indonesia (in-
cluding a destructive attack on the Chinese embassy by some 2,000 demon-
27 Interview with Maman Tahsin, Woerden, the Netherlands, 18-11-2008. When he stood
down, the Indonesian ambassador to Sri Lanka, M. Ali Chanafiah, received, via Cuba, a
telegram purportedly from the PKI Central Committee, signed by Sudisman, instructing
him to go to China. Instead, he went to the USSR (Chanafiah and Chanafiah 2010:295).
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strators on 12 April 1966) were countered by anti-Indonesian demonstrations
in Beijing (Sukma 1999:34; Van der Kroef 1968:38–9). On 27 April 1967, Indone-
sia expelled two Chinese diplomats. In response, China expelled Indonesia’s
interim chargé d’affaires Baron Sutadisastra (1915–1990) and press attaché Soe-
marno Sosrohardjono.28 Over August and September, Indonesia recalled its
diplomatic staff or had them declared personae non grata. Indonesian for-
eign minister Adam Malik had been keen to maintain workable relations with
China, but when ‘a renewed outbreak of anti-Chinese rioting in Jakarta coin-
cided with the takeover of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pek-
ing by an “ultraleft” group in the middle of 1967’, the bilateral relationship
became ‘destabilizing’ (Crouch 1978:333). Thousands of ethnic Chinese fled
from Indonesia to China in the wake of the anti-Chinese attacks (Xie 2010). On
9 October 1967, Indonesia declared a ‘freeze’ on relations, closing the Indone-
sian embassy, with Beijing announcing its suspension of ties with Indonesia on
28 October.
4 The PKI in China
Two ideological streams emerged in the PKI during 1966/1967:
The firstwas represented in Indonesia by a group styling itself thePolitical
Committee of the PKI and reputedly headed, until his arrest in Decem-
ber 1966, by Sudisman, a Politburo member; this group had its counter-
part among the expatriates in China led by Politburo member Adjitorop.
The second stream, which called itself theMarxist–Leninist Group of the
Communist Party of Indonesia,was centred inMoscowand seems tohave
had little if any organized following inside Indonesia itself.
Mortimer 1974:395
A discussion of the Indonesian exiles in the USSR can be found elsewhere
(Hill 2014), but suffice it to say that, just as tensions and conflicts between the
communist parties of the USSR and the PRC ensured no single bloc emerged
to speak for communist states, relentless vitriol and ideological dispute over
decades between the Moscow-based Comite Luar Negeri PKI (CL-PKI, Over-
seas Committee of the PKI) and the Beijing-basedDelegasi Comite Central-PKI
28 Newsreel footage of their departure can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
dX6SI0HPSCo (accessed 6-5-2019).
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figure 4
Jusuf Adjitorop, Beijing, 1965
from Hersri Setiawan collection,
International Institute of Social
History
(CC-PKI, Delegation of the Central Committee of the PKI) ensured the PKI in
exile remained hopelessly divided across ideological lines.
The party’s largest cadre base abroad was in China. As the Indonesian milit-
ary hadmoved to capture or execute thenational PKI leadership in Indonesia,29
one of the few remaining senior office-bearers was Jusuf Adjitorop (see Fig-
ure 4), a PKI Central Committee and Politburo member who had been under-
goingmedical treatment in China since 26 June 1964. Adjitoropwas thus thrust
from relative obscurity to becoming the party’s most senior leader.
Born Josef Simanjuntak in Balige, North Tapanuli, 19 December 191830 (and
dying in Beijing on 3 June 1999), Adjitorop joined the PKI in Yogya in May
1947. He relinquished his birth name for the pseudonym by which he was sub-
sequently knownwhen the PKI instructed him tomove back to North Sumatra
as an underground organizer in 1949. After becoming a member of the PKI
Central Committee, in 1959 he became the deputy head of the party secretariat
29 Njoto was captured and shot ‘sometime after attending a cabinet meeting on 6 Novem-
ber’ (Crouch 1978:161). D.N. Aidit was captured on 22 November 1965 and murdered the
following day. ‘Of the senior PKI leaders captured by the end of 1965, only Njono and Peris
Pardede were not killed immediately’ but subsequently underwent show trials (Crouch
1978:161).
30 He adopted the later date of 20 June 1920 as the birthday he provided on his primary-
school (HIS) graduating certificate in order to gain entry to high school (MULO). Biograph-
ical information is drawn primarily from his 12-page autobiography; see Jusuf Adjitorop
Papers, International Institute for Social History (hereafter IISH), Indonesian Exiles of the
Left collection, 1923–1996, Bundle IV, Item 23.
Downloaded from Brill.com07/02/2020 01:41:50AM
via free access
350 hill
Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde 176 (2020) 338–372
figure 5 Jusuf Adjitorop (l) and Zhou Enlai (r.), Beijing, 1960s
from Hersri Setiawan collection, International Institute
of Social History
and secretary of the Central Committee in Jakarta. After his despatch to China
for medical treatment, he represented the party at the 15-year anniversary of
the establishment of the PRC on 1 October 1964 (together with Tjoo Tik Tjoen
and Suharyo).
As Adjitorop later wrote, ‘on the 22 February 1966 [I] received the decision
[ketetapan] from the Politburo of the PKI Central Committee to lead the Cent-
ral Committee Delegation abroad’.31 Mortimer noted (1974:391) that ‘by the end
of 1966 all members of the Politburo had been killed or taken prisoner except
Adjitorop, who had the good fortune to be in China at the time of the coup
attempt’. Adjitorop gathered around him a dozen senior party members—
either members of the Central Committee or the Verification Committee—
31 Jusuf Adjitorop Papers, Indonesian Exiles of the Left collection, IISH, Bundle IV, Item 23,
p. 12.
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who became collectively known as ‘the Delegation (of the PKI Central Com-
mittee)’ (hereafter: the Delegation).
Other members of the Delegation had either been in China on 30 Septem-
ber 1965 or were able to get there from elsewhere around the globe. In China
as members of the official Indonesian mission for Chinese National Day were:
Mohamad Zaelani (1921–2007) and Nung Cik AR, both of whom had been rep-
resenting the PKI in the Indonesian parliamentary delegation; Basuki Reso-
bowo (1916–1999), in the Indonesian artists’ delegation; and Supeno, in the
journalists’ delegation.32 Included also were Sidik Kertapati (1920–2007),
Jamanhari, Ruslan Kamaluddin, and former minister and mayor of Semarang
(between 1958 and 1960) Abdulmadjid Djojoadiningrat (b. 1904; known as
‘Abu’). Ashar SuciptoMunandar (1924–2010) had been visiting East Germany at
the invitation of the government to represent the PKI’s Marxist–Leninist train-
ing college, the Ali Archam Academy of Social Sciences, of which he was the
pro-rector, but he moved to Beijing in 1966. He was the second-to-last mem-
ber to join the Delegation, followed by Ms Setiati Surasto (1920–2006), the
chair of the PKI’s Europe Committee and secretary of the World Federation
of Trade Unions, Prague. After his arrival in Beijing from Havana in January
1966, Ibrahim Isa (1930–2016) served on the staff of the Delegation.33 The CC-
PKI delegation both mobilized the exiles within China and represented the
PKI at pro-Chinese international fraternal party events. For example, Adjitorop
attended the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Labour Party in November 1966
(with Munandar) and the Sixth Congress in Albania (with Zaelani) in Novem-
ber 1971.
Crucially, when the Delegation put out a call for cadres and sympathizers
abroad to regroup in China, hundreds came from the USSR, Cuba, the Middle
East, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. It was a strategy supported by the
Chinese hosts. One Indonesian student in Moscow recalled several invitations
from theChinese embassy assuring the Indonesians theywould be looked after
if they came to China. For some cadres, it was a painful choice; they sacrificed
32 Confidential Interview, 26-5-2009, Rotterdam, the Netherlands.
33 Manap 2009:144. Isa had served as Indonesia’s permanent representative at theAfro-Asian
Peoples’ Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) in Cairo (1960–65) (McGregor and Hearman
2017) and headed the (pro-Sukarnoist) Indonesian delegation to the First Solidarity Con-
ference of Peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America (known as the Tricontinental Confer-
ence) inHavana in January 1966, after which hewent to China (Hearman [2016]). Djawoto
was given no role by the delegation, nor was he reliant on them due to his links with the
Chinese Foreign Affairs Department, until he left for Amsterdam in 1979. He remained so
popular amongst the exiles that about 600 people attended his funeral in the Netherlands
in 1992. Interview with Sarmadji, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 8-11-2008.
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figure 6 Delegation of the CC-PKI with the CC-CCP, Beijing, February 1966
from Hersri Setiawan collection, International Institute
of Social History
completing their studies abroad to answer the call of the party. Solar-energy
student Warsito Darmosukarto (see Figure 2), for example, who followed the
Delegation’s call in late 1967, recalls crying at night in China at the loss of his
chance to write his thesis and complete his qualification in Moscow.34 Most,
like PKI chairperson D.N. Aidit’s daughter Ibarruri, who was studying in the
USSR, came enthusiastically, believing theywere helping the party’s resurgence
(Alam 2006). They were hopeful their stay in China would be a relatively short
preparation for returning home.
The CC-PKI delegation was recognized by Beijing as the sole legitimate rep-
resentation of the PKI abroad, and it was the most visible international mani-
festation of the PKI, despatching representatives to various sympathetic coun-
tries to establish a clear chain of party communication. For example, at various
times, Setiati Surasto, SophianWaluyo, AnwarDharma, andMargono represen-
ted the PKI delegation in Albania, while Jamanhari served in this role in Viet-
nam.35 It authorized the production of a range of regular and irregular public-
ations, both in China and elsewhere. These included Indonesian Tribune (pub-
lished inTirana, Albania), which routinely condemned the ‘fascistmilitary gov-
ernment’ in Jakarta. Indonesian Tribune’s inaugural edition included the Polit-
34 Kusuma 2015 and interview withWarsito Darmosukarto, Stockholm, Sweden, 10-6-2009.
35 Interview with Chalik Hamid and Sulardjo, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 15-5-2009. On
Jamanhari, see Manap 2009:78. On the rival PKI representation in Moscow, see Hill 2014.
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buro’s declaration of 7 August 1966 that the ‘urgent task’ was ‘the creation of a
united front under PKI leadership and the development of armed struggle to
overthrow the fascist regime of Suharto–Nasution’.36 Twelve months after the
30 September upheaval, the Delegation published the PKI’s new programme,
titled ‘Build the PKI along theMarxist–Leninist line to lead the people’s demo-
cratic revolution in Indonesia’ (known as the ‘Auto-criticism’).37
The exiles produced a wide variety of publications attacking the NewOrder.
In China, these included Berita Pertimbangan (News for consideration) and
Suara Rakyat Indonesia (Voice of the Indonesian people). In addition, they
used the Indonesian language service to broadcast anti-NewOrdermaterial on
Radio Peking, where someworked as journalists and translators.With the relo-
cation to Beijing of Ibrahim Isa, Indonesian representative in the Afro-Asian
Peoples’ Solidarity Organization, monthly bulletins were issued by the Organ-
isasi Internasional Solidaritas Rakyat-Rakyat Asia Afrika (OISRAA, Indonesian
Organization for Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity), attacking the Soeharto
regime—and promoting ‘Mao Zedong Thought’.38 Chinese media carried art-
icles by Delegation members and supported pro-Delegation publications like
the Afro-Asian Journalist.39
While busily producing such materials for public consumption, the Delega-
tion enforced a strict sense of internal party discipline, secrecy, and ideological
rigour.40 Adjitorop regarded it as a key principle of the undergroundmovement
that cadres must ‘never reveal Party secrets to people outside the Party, includ-
ing other comrades inside the Partywith no direct involvement in thematter’.41
36 Simon 1969:173–4, cited in Sukma 1999:50.
37 Van der Kroef 1970:57; reprinted in Sudisman 2000:81–139.
38 On the OISRAA bulletins, see McGregor 2019:152–5.
39 Sukma 1999:50. See Zhou (2019a) for an analysis of theAfro-Asian Journalists’ Association.
40 Manyexiles remain reluctant toprovide specific names, locations, dates, or numberswhen
interviewed about their experiences in exile, believing the code of (party) secrecy still
binds, as does their desire to avoid implicating others who might still be stigmatized or
victimized by the authorities. Even published memoirs frequently only use people’s ini-
tials rather than actual names. Commonly, too, partymembers adopted noms de guerre to
replace birth names.
41 Quoted from ‘Berjuang di luar negeri untukmengabdi perjuangan di tanah air dilihat dari
keharusanmemadukan perjuangan legal dan illegal’, typescript (no author, no date), Jusuf
Adjitorop Papers, Indonesian Exiles of the Left Collection, IISH, Item 52.
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5 Challenges of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976)
For China, 1965 was a time ‘when the final stage was set for a devastating
decade-long period of internal turmoil, the so-called “Great Proletariat Cul-
tural Revolution” ’ (Liu 2011:5). It was a period of unsettling dislocation for
the Indonesian exiles, who were subject to a policy of containment, for ease
of management, and removed from the capital to the countryside. For the
exiles, communication with the Chinese government was conducted primar-
ily, if not exclusively, via the Delegation. All key decisions, such as where the
exiles lived and worked, and the funding provided to them, were determined
by the Chinese Communist Party, which as host ensured their welfare through
the Delegation.
Theprecise number of Indonesians inChina during this period is impossible
to determine. Indonesian military sources put exile numbers at around 700.42
In January 1966, Ibrahim Isa estimated that there were at least 300 Indonesian
exiles there then,most of whomwere students.43 Literary criticAjipRosidi con-
cluded only that ‘there were quite a lot of Indonesians in China at that time, to
the extent that they constituted a separate colony, which had quite large num-
bers’.44 One reason for a lack of precision was the veil of secrecy enforced by
the Delegation.
While the separation of foreigners from the Chinese population predated
theCultural Revolution, ensuring the safety of the Indonesian exiles during this
period of chaos provided an additional justification for their containment from
the local community. Many were put up initially in various hotels or residen-
tial compounds around the capital, such as the Friendship Hotel complex, the
PekingHotel, and theMinzhuHotel.45Asnewgroups arrived, theywere accom-
modated together inwhatwere effectively holding centres aroundBeijing, such
as those known to the exiles simply as Desa Merah (Red Village) and Pulau
Merah (Red Island).46
42 Djamhari and TNI 2009:188. The figure of 700, sourced fromaNovember 1966Antara news
agency report in The Djakarta Times (23-11-1966), is also quoted in Van der Kroef (1968:22,
fn. 14).
43 Interview with Ibrahim Isa, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 21-11-2008. On Indonesia and
AAPSO, see McGregor and Hearman 2017.
44 See Ajip Rosidi’s ‘Introduction’ in Sontani 2001:16.
45 On the Friendship Hotel complex, its occupants, and its facilities, see Hooper 2016:168–
71. Indonesian exile Noor Djaman (1988) used the Friendship Hotel as the setting for his
English-language novel, It happened in Beijing, which was about the international com-
munity there.
46 Interview with Soejoso, Paris, France, 25-6-2009.
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TheCultural Revolution closed educational institutions andmany exiles lost
their employment. The decision was made to move the Indonesians from the
capital. According to Indonesian dramatist UtuyTatang Sontani, who had been
sent toBeijing on aLekra delegation toundergo treatment for a liver complaint,
the Indonesians were informed by PKI representatives that
[a]ll comrades have to leave Peking. Not only the comrades who came to
China as part of the delegation, including those who came for medical
treatment […]. Also the students and the government employees who
have lived in Peking for ages, they are all obliged to leave Peking, leave
their school benches and theirworkplaces. Theywill be gathered together
in a particular location.
Sontani 2001:90
Within three days, Sontani was transported ‘to the South’ (p. 91) to Nanjing,
joining more than a hundred other Indonesian exiles in a camp the Indone-
sians dubbed ‘Cengkareng’ (after a district on the fringes of Jakarta) but which
appears plausibly to have been the Nanjing Military Academy.47
Like many of these settlements, Cengkareng compound was surrounded by
a two-metre-high wall and guarded by military armed with bayonets (Sontani
2001:92, 104).The exileswere providedwithmilitary fatigues towear and copies
of MaoZedongThought to study; theywere also required to replace their actual
names with noms de guerre. Guerrilla training and political re-education were
ostensibly to prepare them for repatriation to rebuild the party. Personal and
political discipline was severe. Letters and communication with the outside
world were directed only through the Delegation to the Chinese Communist
Party liaison. Under such stifling conditions, the community turned upon itself
in ‘self-criticism’ with in-fighting common, political denunciation de rigeur,
and personal attacks exposed in ‘wall posters/papers’ (koran dinding).
As the Red Guards waged their attacks upon political deviationists outside,
within the compounds the Indonesians mimicked such radical excesses, form-
ing their own ‘revolutionary brigades’ (Barisan Berontak Revolusioner, BBR)
and factional ‘groups’ (kelompok) in strident criticisms and counter-criticisms,
47 Sulardjo recalls there being about 120 Indonesians initially in Cengkareng (interviewwith
Kadir Sulardjo, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 15-5-2009). While my informants did not
refer to it as theNanjingMilitary Academy, Zhou (2014:56–7) argues convincingly that this
was in fact where the Indonesians were housed. In the early 1960s, several hundred cadres
of the Parti Komunis Malaya (Malayan Communist Party) also completed their political
and military training at this academy (Chin 2004:367).
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figure 7
(l to r) D.N. Aidit, Mao Zedong, Tanti Aidit,
Jusuf Adjitorop, Beijing, 5 August 1965
from Hersri Setiawan collection,
International Institute of Social
History
encouraged to resolve ideological deviation. Such groups often coalesced
around differing attitudes to the Delegation, since it was this authority that
primarily determined the parameters of Indonesian community life.
Newcomers, like Soejoso, who answered the call of the Delegation to come
inmid 1968, found the party in disarray and a crisis of confidence in theDelega-
tion. On his arrival Soejoso was welcomed not by the Delegation but instead by
a newly established Badan Persiapan Konperensi Kader (BPKK, Body for the
Preparation of a Cadres’ Conference), which had emerged initially with the
support of theDelegation to convene a ‘cadres’ conference’ to review the future
of the party in exile. Chaired byTom IljaswithDelegationmemberA.S. (‘Cipto’)
Munandar as deputy, the BPKK spent more than six months trying to organize
ameeting of Indonesian leftists from around theworld to revitalize the party.48
Some of the group’s most active supporters regarded the replacement of Adjit-
orop as essential for the rejuvenation of the party-in-exile.49 In effect, the BPKK
assumed de factomanagement of the Indonesian exile community for a period.
48 Interview with Tom Iljas, Södertälje, Sweden, 11-6-2009. Iljas, formerly a member of the
leftist Pemuda Rakyat (People’s Youth)movement and the Ikatan Pemuda Pelajar Indone-
sia (IPPI, Indonesian Youth and Students’ Union), had been studying at the Agricultural
Institute, Beijing, on an Indonesian Department of Education scholarship. After years of
resisting the authority of the delegation, he migrated to Sweden in 1972, where he is a
leading figure in the Indonesian exile community. Munandar was in exile in China for
two decades; from 1985 until his death in 2010, he resided in the Netherlands.
49 Interview with Kadir Sulardjo, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 15-5-2009.
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However, themajority of the Delegationwithdrew their support for the con-
ference, leading the Chinese authorities to thwart the gathering by refusing
the BPKK access to any venue or infrastructure for the event. The Chinese
simply refused to acknowledge any communication from the exiles unless
authorized by the Delegation under Adjitorop. As a result, no ‘cadres’ confer-
ence’ or consequent party rejuvenation took place, with the Delegation gradu-
ally reasserting its authority. Disagreements over the running of the Delega-
tion then led three members—Basuki Resobowo, Nung Cik, and Abdulmadjid
Djojoadiningrat—to relinquish their positions.50
Several prominent Indonesian sojourners expressed deep scepticism about
Adjitorop’s capacity to lead the party. One of the most senior Indonesian mil-
itary officers in exile, General Suhario Padmodiwiryo (known as ‘Hario Kecik’),
who had been sent by President Sukarno to study at the Military Academy of
the Armed Forces General Staff51 in Moscow from February 1965, remained
abroad after the New Order came to power. In 1970, he met Adjitorop dur-
ing a visit to Beijing, and ‘in those conversations, I came to the conclusion he
showed signs of “Multiple Personality Disease” at a serious level’. However, he
continued, ‘that did not surprise me because I knew also that I was confronted
with a patient with serious hepatitis, liver disease’. General Suhario claimed
that Adjitorop ‘felt himself to be a leader of the Chinese Communist Party. He
spoke of the PRC as the “fortress of theRevolution” and about theGreatChinese
Proletarian Revolution as essential, in a manner which strengthened my dia-
gnosis [of him].’52 Similarly unflattering are the memoirs of the playwright
Utuy Tatang Sontani in which he depicts ‘Urip’ (Adjitorop’s nom de guerre) as
tearfully declaring he was standing down as party leader after a particularly
bruising public criticism—only then to leave the exiles’ compound to return
to Beijing, where he continued in the role of Delegation head.53
50 Interview with Chalik Hamid and Sulardjo, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 15-5-2009.
51 While Suhario’s memoirs refer to it as the Suvorov academy, for the period 1969–1992 the
full name of the institution (translated from Russian) appears to be ‘Military Order of
Lenin Red-Banner Order of Suvorov Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forced
of the USSR Named After Voroshilov’ (personal communicationwithWarunoMahdi, 1-10-
2019). See also http://vagsh.mil.ru/O_VUZe/history (accessed 2-10-2019).
52 Kecik 2013:xxii. After 12 years in the USSR, the PRC, and Vietnam, Suhario returned to
Indonesia in 1977. He was then detained for four and a half years, after which he was
required to report regularly to the authorities. He later published a series of memoirs.
Interview with Suhario Padmodiwiryo, Bekasi, Indonesia, 26-1-2007. He recounts his con-
versations with both Adjitorop and Djawoto in Padmodiwiryo 2005:273–94.
53 Sontani’s account Under a starless sky carried the sub-title ‘Memoir? Autobiography?
Novel? The important thing is that it is expressed, shining in the dark of night’ (Sontani
2001). I am mindful of the complex issues associated with accepting such materials as
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There were grave doubts over Adjitorop’s strategy of calling all exiles to
relocate to China. One rebel group of cadres (known as Cingkan Syang) told
General Suhario that Adjitorop had made a serious error in ‘calling all cadres
who had good positions in Europe to gather here. In fact, he had absolutely
no concept of what to do then. Because of that, all kinds of fruitless internal
disputes have arisen’ (Padmodiwiryo 2005:205, 214). Some went so far as to
describe onemember of the CC-PKI in China as a ‘psychopath’ (Padmodiwiryo
2005:224).
Over time, the Delegation struggled to maintain its authority as the com-
munity splintered.Within three months of arriving in Beijing in July 1968, Soe-
joso, along with other exiles arriving in the country around that time, was also
sent out of Beijing toNanjing’s GunungMerah (RedMountain), where he spent
the next two years undergoing political re-education and military training.54
This re-education was intended to strengthen party loyalty to the Delegation
and highlight the errors of party factionalism such as the BPKK. While the
Chinese hosts established the broad parameters for the political discussions
within the compounds, it was the exiles themselves who ran the auto-criticism
and re-education. It was a sometimes gruelling and frustrating period of debate
anddiscussion asmany of the exiles searched for strategies to return to Indone-
sia. As Manap (2013:51) later wrote of his experiences in the compounds: ‘In
each discussion ormeeting or whatever you’d call it, there was always the topic
of going home, going home, and going back to our homeland. But what did it
produce? Only a very boring life.’
Over time the exiles were moved between a variety of ‘projects’ (as such set-
tlements were known). After several years, Soejoso, for example, was moved
from Gunung Merah to another ‘project’ to labour in a factory alongside
Chinese.Other exileswere despatched towork in fishing or peasant communit-
ies. According to Soejoso’s recollections, there were five main projects, each
with a population of around 30 to 35.55 These included Sungai Merah (Red
River), Gunung Merah (Red Mountain) and Chi Gong-san (Jigong-shan), and
Cengkareng Lama (Old Cengkareng), which was sub-divided again into Per-
cikan Api (Spark) and Padang Lalang (Prairie).56 But he believed there may
have been other secret camps, for the exiles generally had little idea of who
‘factual’, but I believe they do contribute to our understanding of the experiences of
exile.
54 Interview with Soejoso, Paris, France, 25-6-2009.
55 Interview with Soejoso, Paris, France, 25-6-2009.
56 The two previous names were taken from Mao’s statement ‘A single spark can start a
prairie fire’ (5-1-1930).
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was in the various settlements, precisely where theywere located, or how other
compounds operated.57 Such informationwas only disseminatedona ‘need-to-
know’ basis by Delegation members.
In general, however, the compounds were guarded by the military and kept
the Indonesians isolated from the Chinese population, with occupants requir-
ing a pass to leave even for brief absences.While the vast majority of the exiles
were male, there were numerous families and single women also accommod-
ated in the same settlements. Exiles who supported the Delegation and those
who opposed it as well as those who sought simply to isolate themselves from
internal party contradictions all appeared randomly allocated to particular set-
tlements. An individual’s allocated project often related more to their time of
arrival in China than their membership of the party, ideological standpoint, or
other distinguishing factors.
Sobron Aidit (1934–2007), for example, brother of murdered PKI chairman
D.N. Aidit, had been teaching Indonesian studies in Beijing since 1964, but
from 1970 to 1977 he was reassigned to work with, and learn from, Chinese
peasants. He was sent to the isolated village of Chi Gong-san (dubbed the
Chicken-HeadMountain villageby the Indonesians),more than 200kilometres
by largely unsealed dirt road from the Jiangxi provincial capital, Nanchang
(S. Aidit 2006:11). There the Indonesians were in a ‘7 May Cadre School’, where
they studied political theory (specifically Mao Zedong Thought, and other
Marxist classics) from 8 am to noon.58 After lunch, from 2.30 to 6pm, they
laboured, mainly in agricultural and animal production. In his memoirs,
Sobron Aidit describes their life in Chi Gong-san as ‘quite good, even pos-
sibly very good’. They received pocket money from their hosts, had abundant
food, medicine and medical attention, and clothing, and even cigarettes were
provided free of charge. What they lacked, however, was personal freedom.59
Cengkareng was a community riven by splits and hostilities, leaderless and
frustrated, andunder intense ideological pressure from theCultural Revolution
that was taking place outside, andwhose effects constantly rippled throughout
57 Interviewwith Soejoso, Paris, France, 25-6-2009; personal communication with Tom Iljas,
31-5-2019.
58 On7May 1966,MaoZedong issued a directive for the establishment of farms, later dubbed
‘7 May Cadre Schools’, where urban cadres and intellectuals would be relocated to engage
in manual labour and political reeducation.
59 S. Aidit 2006:64. Tatiana Lukman has argued that, compared to ordinary Chinese citizens,
the Indonesian exiles were treated with relative privilege, being provided with free board,
accommodation, and even coastal holidays and special facilities, like ice to cool their
rooms on hot days. Irfan Teguh, ‘Cerpen yang memicu perdebatan lama tentang Trotsky-
isme’, 2018, Tirto.id (accessed 12-3-2019).
Downloaded from Brill.com07/02/2020 01:41:50AM
via free access
360 hill
Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde 176 (2020) 338–372
the cordoned exile compound (Sontani 2001:100). Sontani recounts several
individuals succumbing to serious mental illness, including a young woman,
recently married, who was taken back to a mental institution in Beijing (Son-
tani 2001:115), and a young man who frequently broke down in tears as he
bowed imploringly before a statue of Mao, begging to be able to return home
(Sontani 2001:130).
It is recognized that refugees are likely to suffer from after-effects of the
conflict or displacement which uprooted them, with survivors of concentra-
tion camps especially susceptible to long-term psychological complications.
While the Indonesians in China were not in concentration camps, the isol-
ated, cordoned nature of their lives shared certain oppressive characteristics.
Exiles spoke in hushed tones of compatriots suffering psychological illnesses
or self-harm, one severing his penis during a psychotic incident. The party’s
leadership-in-exile too was subject to intense psychological stress. Delegation
member Jamanhari, who represented the PKI in Vietnam, committed suicide
in a hotel inNanningwhile returning toVietnam fromChina on 22April 1970.60
That their Chinese hosts, with the support of the Delegation, prohibited
them from socializing with local Chinese, especially from developing romantic
attachments, added to the stress of the many young adults. For example, when
Maman Tahsin’s budding romance with a local girl was discovered, she was
sent away as a punishment.61 Indonesians were not unique in this, as West-
erners (and most foreigners) in China during this period were also preven-
ted from fraternizing—andcertainly frommarrying—locals (Hooper 2016:179).
But for the Indonesians, the insularity of their community and their uncertain
fate exacerbated their hopelessness and disillusionment, leading an increasing
number to seek passage to theWest. For other exiles, their zeal to gain revolu-
tionary experience relevant to their homeland encouraged them to join com-
munist forces in Vietnam, Burma, or Cambodia.62 Several of those who went
to Burma or Vietnam, where anti-fraternization policies were not imposed, left
these countries years later with local spouses. It was not until about 1977, with
the end of the Cultural Revolution, that barriers against romances with locals
were relaxed, bywhich time both the exiles and the Chinese hosts realized that
the Indonesians had little chance of returning home.63
60 Manap (2009:78) details Jamanhari’s suicide while A. Aidit (2006?:225–6) describes it and
its traumatic impact upon the exile community without naming Jamanhari.
61 Interview with Maman Tahsin, Woerden, the Netherlands, 18-11-2008.
62 Published exilic accounts of their experiences in Burma and Vietnam include A.A. Aidit
2006, A. Aidit 2006?, Alam 2006, and Manap 2009.
63 Interview with Soejoso, Paris, France, 25-6-2009. Qin Bo (n.d.) notes that ‘during the 30
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6 Dissolution of the Party, Rapprochement between Governments
From as early as 1971, however, as disillusionment started to take hold, small
numbers of Indonesian exiles began leaving China for the West. The level of
difficulty they encountered depended on whether they had the Delegation’s
approval. For the most part, initial departees in the 1970s did not. For them it
was a fraught process, in which they were harangued and branded ‘anti-party’.
As an example, in addition to his failed attempt to rejuvenate the party through
the BPKK, Tom Iljas also led a group of 40 in a three-day hunger strike, demand-
ing exit permits. Though the initial protest was unsuccessful, many persevered
and in 1972 Iljas did manage to leave China for Sweden.64
One former exile, who had arrived in Beijing in 1967 after studying port
engineering in the USSR, recalls that from the early 1970s until his departure in
1982, eachmonth at least three or four Indonesians would leave for theWest.65
Such moves required ingenuity and courage. In 1973, for example, journalist
Umar Said (1928–2011) gained asylum in France. Undeterred by the fact that,
likemany exiles, his passport had expired, Umar Said had a false stampmade to
extend it himself in order to gain exit from China and initial entry into France.
Assistance from the PRC was generally limited to a one-way ticket and a sum of
about US$20. Amongst those leaving Nanchang in 1973 were Tatiana Lukman
(the daughter of M.H. Lukman, first deputy chairman of the PKI), her husband,
Salim Handatjaia (who had gone to China in August 1965 to undergo medical
treatment), and their son; unlike the vastmajority of exiles, they chose to emig-
rate to Cuba rather than theWest.66
China’s rapprochement with Indonesia in the 1980s made the Delegation
and their hosts more willing to assist those departing. By this time, those exiles
who wished to leave simply informed the Delegation, which passed on their
request with their reasons and preferred destination to their Chinese hosts,
who would then make arrangements, even down to purchasing the tickets
and providing travel funds (of between US$300 and US$700 per person). It
years of isolation, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, international marriages in
China were almost non-existent’ and were regarded as ‘outrageous treachery’. Barriers to
friendships with foreigners began to be lowered soon after Mao’s death in 1976 (Hooper
2016:237).
64 Interview with Tom Iljas, Södertälje, Sweden, 11-6-2009.
65 Confidential Interview, Paris, France, 20-6-2009.
66 Hearman 2010b:91. Tatiana Lukman went to study in China in 1964, moving to Cuba in
1974. After completing a degree in Spanish and French in Havana, she taught there for 12
years before emigrating to theNetherlands (Lukman 2010). Salim remained inCuba,while
their son lives in Canada.
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remained an often agonizing decision, as departure for the West meant cut-
ting ties with the exile community that had, for better or worse, encircled
them in China. Nonetheless, as the network of Indonesian exiles in Western
Europe expanded, Indonesians already there assisted newcomers. Many were
welcomed at Paris airport, for example, by Umar Said, stalwart of the Indone-
sian exile community in France. Iljas, similarly, provided support and counsel
to those choosing Sweden.
As the exiles were increasingly regarded as an impediment to the renewal
of bilateral relations, in the 1980s even well-connected members of the exile
community, like Sobron Aidit, were losing benefits. After the death of his wife
in August 1980, his employment contract with Radio Beijing was not renewed
in August 1981, and that December he left with his two young daughters for
Paris (S. Aidit 2006:154, 166, 213). There are even reports some exiles returned
clandestinely to Indonesia, where they were eventually arrested.67
In April 1985, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian visited Indonesia for the thirti-
eth anniversary of the Bandung Conference, marking a significant political re-
alignment. In this new environment, PKI cadres in China posed an unwelcome
impediment to the normalization of political relations. With Indonesian State
Secretary Sudharmono stressing that normalizationwas conditional on Beijing
cutting all ties with the PKI, Wu declared: ‘The Chinese Communist Party no
longer sends congratulations on the anniversary of the PKI. PKI members who
fled to China now are old and ill, and no longer active.’ The exiles were now
‘treated as individuals not as members of a fraternal communist party. They
are not regarded as a particular party.’68 The Chinese government thus flagged
to the exiles and to the New Order its withdrawal of political support for the
exiles. The majority of those still in China sought refuge elsewhere.
Amongst the stragglers leaving was SyarkawiManap. Having begun his exile
studying in Cuba, only a few days after relocating to China in 1966 Manap
had been despatched by the Delegation first to Vietnam for two years and
then to Burma for six, before finally returning to China with his Burmese wife
and their children. He recalls being informed that the Delegation was dis-
banding itself and that members of the Indonesian community still in China
67 Sutikno (2015:50) claims that Tamjis Darmono and Yuwono Ali (alias Sumanang Effendy)
entered Indonesia in early March 1982 but were captured in Solo on 8 August 1983.
68 Quoted inRosihanAnwar, ‘Sadiatjaya Sudimanpemimpin baru PKI’, 23-5-1985, Jusuf Adjit-
orop Papers, Indonesian Exiles of the Left collection, IISH, Bundle IV, No. 25. (Photocopy
in author’s possession.)
Downloaded from Brill.com07/02/2020 01:41:50AM
via free access
delegated authority 363
Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde 176 (2020) 338–372
could make their own decisions as to their fate. He personally interpreted that
as the end of the PKI, later writing:
The leadership of the PKI abroad, which had been led by Bung Yusuf Ajit-
orop [sic] disbanded itself. The disbanding of the party organization was
firstly of course on the basis that the Central Committee of the PKI in our
homeland had not functioned for a long time and the party organization
at various levels had not existed for a long period. […] Apart from that,
the fraternal party which for some time had been our support and refuge
had begun to change its attitude for its national interests. As guests of
the Chinese Communist Party it was natural that we would respect their
national interests.
Manap 2009:176
In early 1986, along with most of the approximately 50 Indonesian exiles then
remaining in China, Manap and his family organized to leave. They sold their
belongings and, with Ibrahim Isa’s assistance, obtained their visa stamps for
their new country of asylum, Sweden, as suggested by the Chinese government
representative. The Chinese funded their plane tickets and provided US$700
per person, which was effectively all they brought with them to their new
refuge.69
In an anonymous typescript about the PKI’s international priorities titled
‘Waging the struggle abroad’, written some time after September 1985 and
marked ‘not to bemade public’, the author (most plausibly Adjitorop) emphas-
ized the need ‘to work with the tens of thousands of non-Party Indonesians
scattered across the various countries of Western Europe’.70 The author,
acknowledging ‘a correction to my former view’, concedes that ‘there should
not have been a Representative of the Central Party Leadership openly abroad’
[emphasis in the original]. The author continues, ‘Nomatter howgreat the con-
tribution we can make, the leadership of the Party remains in the homeland’
(p. 6). The document may be regarded as one of the last statements to emerge
from the PKI delegation. Adjitorop remained in China, but his representative
role for the PKI was eclipsed. On 2 July 1986, he was appointed part-time pro-
69 Interview with Syarkawi Manap, Stockholm, Sweden, 10-6-2009.
70 ‘Berjuang di luar negeri untuk mengabdi perjuangan di tanah air dilihat dari keharusan
memadukanperjuangan legal dan illegal’ (Waging the struggle abroad to serve the struggle
in thehomeland, viewed fromtheobligation tounite the legal and illegal struggles), (Tidak
untuk diumumkan) [Not to bemade public], no date, no location, Jusuf Adjitorop Papers,
Indonesian Exiles of the Left Collection, IISH, Item 52. Quotation from p. 4.
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figure 8
Jusuf Adjitorop, Beijing, 1982
from Hersri Setiawan collection, International Institute
of Social History
fessor of law at the Peking University Law Faculty, lecturing both there and in
the Indonesian language and culture section of that university’s Faculty of Ori-
ental Studies for the remainder of his working life.
When Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen met Indonesian state minister
Murdiono in 1989, he stressedChina’s repudiation of the PKI, noting that ‘China
had no connection with the Indonesian Communist Party—we did not even
know there was such a party today. […]We did not allow Indonesians living in
China to engage inpolitical activities’ (Qichen 2005:93–4, cited inZhou 2014:57,
fn. 128). By the time Chinese premier Li Peng landed in Jakarta, on 8 August
1990, to normalize diplomatic relations, there was little remaining evidence of
the hundreds of Indonesians who had taken refuge in China a quarter of a cen-
tury earlier. Less than a dozen elderly and ill cadres remained, together with
their offspring. Everyone else had since departed at their own initiative, and
with the encouragement and assistance of the Chinese.71
As Adjitorop later wrote to the Japanese journalist Seiichi Okawa:
The unfreezing of diplomatic relations, officially undertaken after 8
August 1990 […] was a major contribution to stability and peace in Asia.
And therefore, for the world. I respect the Memorandum of Understand-
ing (MOU) which was signed on 8 August 1990 by the two governments:
Indonesia and China, in accordance with the Bandung Principles and the
principles of Peaceful Co-existence.72
Despite living for a quarter of a century in exile with his cancelled Indonesian
passport, he asserted with pride: ‘I remain a citizen of the Republic of Indone-
sia.’ On a deeply personal note, he added: ‘[M]y longing for my homeland you
can imagine. Living abroad for more than 30 years, separated from my village
71 Website of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Indonesia, at
http://id.china‑embassy.org/eng/zgyyn/t87359.htm (accessed 8-3-2009).
72 Document located in Jusuf Adjitorop Papers, Indonesian Exiles of the Left Collection,
IISH, Bundle IV, Item 29.
Downloaded from Brill.com07/02/2020 01:41:50AM
via free access
delegated authority 365
Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde 176 (2020) 338–372
figure 9
Jusuf Adjitorop, Beijing, c. 1996
from Hersri Setiawan
collection, International
Institute of Social History
and family.’ He appeals in his letter for the right of all exiles to return to Indone-
sia, something he himself was never able to do. He died in China in 1999.
The last remainingmemberof theDelegation, SuciptoMunandar,was repor-
ted by some exiles to have stated, prior to his death in the Netherlands in
2010, that he had surrendered his mandate as member of the PKI delegation to
someone in Indonesia before 2000, but this claim cannot be confirmed. Exiles
in the Netherlands with whom I spoke had seen no formal documents circu-
lated over the name of the Delegation since their final years in China, certainly
not since the migration toWestern Europe of all but a handful of cadres.73
7 Leadership Liability
The massacre of leftists, including the PKI hierarchy, in Indonesia had placed
the ailing and isolated members of the PKI delegation in China in the unen-
viable position of trying to fashion the dispersed cadres abroad into a viable
party-in-exile. It was leadership by default, not design. There was no mechan-
ism for the replacement of incompetent or ill delegation members, nor for the
73 Discussion at the home of Chalik Hamid, Amsterdam, 28-9-2012. The most visible and
productive of these was Suar Suroso (b. Padang, 16 May 1930; d. Nanchang, 27 April 2017),
who came to China with his family in February 1967. He had been studying physics at
Lomonosov University in Moscow since September 1961 but had his passport cancelled
by the Indonesian embassy there in August 1966. For his criticisms of the USSR’s continu-
ing relationship with the NewOrder he was declared ‘persona non grata’ by the Soviets in
early 1967, when he relocated to China. There he remained, writing prolifically under his
own name and at least one pseudonym (namely Nurdiana) (Nurdiana 2008:177–8).
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recruitment or rejuvenation of party cadres. Exile accounts reveal the decades
from 1965 to 1986 were marked by dissolution and dismay, and, ultimately, the
disbanding of the leadership in exile.
Adjitorop and his delegation members had been deeply conscious of the
burden they carried. In the concluding paragraphs of a 20-page ‘political doc-
ument’ the Delegation drew up in April 1978, outlining its position on various
party strategies (such as the ‘revolutionary path’ and ‘armed revolution as the
sole path for the liberation of the Indonesian people’), the (unsigned) docu-
ment stressed: ‘The Delegation of the Central Committee of the Indonesian
Communist Party overseas is part of the Central Committee of the Indone-
sian Community Party in the homeland, which implements the Self-Criticism
line. The Delegationmay not replace the Central Committee of the Indonesian
Communist Party.’74 In reality, the Delegation appeared to have had no effect-
ive communication with the party’s Central Committee in Indonesia, which
had been destroyed by the Soeharto regime.75
Sukma has argued that the exiles’ political agitation abroad, together with
domestic resistance efforts by the party, ‘provided the rationale for the New
Order government to continuously pursue its anti-communist campaign and
arrest those suspected as PKI cadres, members or sympathisers’ (Sukma
1999:50). However, while the New Order constantly depicted the PKI as a ‘lat-
ent danger’, and the existence of elements of the party abroad was highlighted
occasionally as an example of that continuing threat, the regime’s focus was
exclusively on crushing opposition at home, with little evidence theNewOrder
regarded the PKI in exile as a danger.76
74 ‘Dokumenpolitik’ (typescript), datedApril 1978, Jusuf Adjitorop Papers, Indonesian Exiles
of the Left Collection, IISH, Item 49; quotation from p. 20. The ‘self-criticism’ was formu-
lated in a document titled ‘Tegakkan PKI jangMarxis–Leninis untuk memimpin Revolusi
Demokrasi Rakjat Indonesia’ (Build the PKI along the Marxist–Leninist Line to lead the
Indonesian People’s Democratic Revolution), produced by the surviving members of the
PKI Central Committee Politburo in Central Java (particularly Sudisman) in Septem-
ber 1966 (and reproduced in Sudisman 2000:81–139 as ‘Kritik otokritik perjalanan Partai
Komunis Indonesia’). It was reprinted by the exiles, who studied it closely.
75 Hearman notes that after the arrest or murder of key PKI leaders like Aidit, Sakirman,
Lukman, and Nyoto by the end of 1965 and the arrest of Sudisman in December 1966,
there were only two Politburo members free, with Ruslan Wijayasastra effectively chair-
person of the ‘emergency’ Central Committee. By July 1968, most of these remaining
leaders, including Ruslan, had been captured; by 1997, all were dead (Hearman 2010a:72,
85–6).
76 The New Order occasionally used actual or purported links to exiles as a justification for
cracking down on domestic opposition. For instance, in 1996, the fledgling Partai Rakyat
Demokratik (PRD, Democratic People’s Party) was depicted in government-based media
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Soemarsono (1921–2019), a senior party member captured in an army crack-
down in East Java in 1968 and detained for nine years, argued the claims Adjit-
oropmade to the Chinese that the PKIwas undergoing a revival and resisting in
Indonesia, which had no basis in reality, merely exacerbated the deplorable liv-
ing conditions of the political prisoners, who gave little thought to the exiles.77
Similarly, an underground PKI member in a historical novel by a former polit-
ical prisoner says: ‘I have received information that our friends overseas have
been sent to several countries to study jungle warfare, to study armed revolu-
tion in the jungles. Perhaps, later they will be secreted back here and take up
armed struggle. But that does not alignwith our reality here’ (Sukanta 2012:151).
Soemarsono confirmed that Adjitorop was acknowledged by many surviving
partymembers, not only abroad but also domestically, as themost-senior party
leader.78 Yet the Indonesian military’s elimination of the party domestically
and the persistent rivalry between the remnants of the PKI in Beijing and in
Moscowmeant a cohesive leadership from exile was unattainable.79
For these Indonesian exiles themselves, the pain of separation from their
homeland and their sense of being abandoned by the party’s leadership was
searing. As Asahan Aidit reflected:
A person cast away has the same fate, wherever and whenever they may
be. He cannot state his own country. He has lost his country. He does not
have a country.His country has been stolen.Hehas lost everything, except
a heart that remains. And with that heart he is only able to feel the most
sour, the most bitter that humans can possibly experience.80
Asahanbelieved the exileswerementally impairedby their experiences, andhe
writes of one friendwhohas a psychological illness: ‘That is a relative definition
because if each one of us was tested by a psychologist perhaps not a single per-
son would pass as fully sane and still normal. We are all psychological patients
living outside amental hospital’ (A. Aidit 2006?:196). In commonwith refugees
elsewhere, the Indonesian exiles shared ‘memories of displacement, coupled
as a ‘Trojan horse’ for the PKI, with covert international links to France-based exiles,
Amnesty International, and the Australian Labor Party (Widada et al. 1996).
77 Interview with Soemarsono, Sydney, Australia, 2-12-2008.
78 Interview with Soemarsono, Sydney, Australia, 2-12-2008.
79 On the rivalry between the pro-Beijing and pro-Moscowmanifestations of the PKI abroad,
see Hill 2014.
80 A. Aidit 2006?:73. Aleida (2017:xiv) also refers to another exile who committed suicide
because of the stress of exile.
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with disempowerment within the new environments’ which, for many, per-
petuated their ‘fear and inability to retain their sense of self without a trusted
community or sustaining belief system’ (Lim 2015:190).
When reflecting upon the party leadership’s policy of calling cadres to re-
group in China, few if any view the strategy as either successful or strategic.
Some exiles remained true believers, defending the party against critics within
andwithout. Formost, however, answering the call of the party inChina proved
a traumatic intermission in their lives. For them, the achievements of the Del-
egation remainmore difficult to quantify than its obvious failure to sustain the
party in exile, a failure exposedmost starkly by Beijing’s decision to jettison the
exiles to establish relations with Soeharto’s Indonesia.
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